Some interesting responses by Ezra Klein, Peter Suderman, Veronique de Rugy, and David French on Romneycare and my recent study of Massachusetts premium growth since 2006. Some more thoughts from me will be forthcoming.
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Energy Secretary: Lower Gas Prices not an Administration Goal
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economy,
Energy
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At least the White House is honest about it:
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High gasoline prices will make research into such [energy] alternatives more urgent, [Energy Secretary] Chu said.Ed Morrissey has more.
“But is the overall goal to get our price” of gasoline down, asked [Rep.] Nunnelee.
“No, the overall goal is to decrease our dependency on oil, to build and strengthen our economy,” Chu replied. “We think that if you consider all these energy policies, including energy efficiency, we think that we can go a long way to becoming less dependent on oil and [diversifying] our supply and we’ll help the American economy and the American consumers.”
Romney Wins in MI, AZ
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2012,
Mitt Romney
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Some reactions from around the web.
Gabriel Malor, looking at the exit polls:
Erick Erickson, continuing his crusade against Romney:
Maggie Haberman at the Politico:
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Gabriel Malor, looking at the exit polls:
In short, in Michigan, Romney carried conservatives, Republicans, Catholics, those who believe working in business is better prep for the presidency than working in government, and those who are most dedicated to voting against President Obama.
Erick Erickson, continuing his crusade against Romney:
When you have a candidate few people really like, whose support is a mile wide and an inch deep, whose raison d’etre (a 4am fancy word) is fixing an economy that is fixing itself without him, and who only wins his actual, factual home state by three percentage points against a guy no one took seriously only two months ago, there really is little reason for independent voters in the general election to choose him if the economy keeps improving.I guess a shrinking labor market is a sign of economic improvement, then! Is this going to be the new anti-Romney line of attack: Just like the White House says, the economy is totally turned around, thanks to Barack Obama? It wouldn't be the first time anti-Romney voices have mimicked Democratic talking points.
Seriously, putting it bluntly, conservatives may not like Barack Obama, but most other people do. And when faced with a guy you like and a guy you don’t like who says he can fix an economy that no longer needs fixing, you’re going to go with the guy you like.
Maggie Haberman at the Politico:
1) A win is a win
It’s the cliche of the cycle, and we’ve found ourselves saying it to defend a Mitt Romney victory more frequently than we’d have ever imagined.
It wasn’t pretty, and he carried Michigan by a smaller margin than in 2008, but the bottom line is that Romney was in a major political fight Tuesday — and he won. He also scored a blowout victory in Arizona. If he had lost Michigan, it’s hard to gauge the level of panic that would have unfolded within GOP ranks.
This is a fascinating behind the scenes story of a quality control manager forced into being a whistleblower.
Hunt wasn’t alone in her worries. According to the government’s suit, Michael Watts, the director of quality control, complained repeatedly to company officials charged with controlling risk. He warned that employees had “marching orders” to fight quality control decisions.
At one large staff meeting, managers praised loan processors for “beating back” the quality control team and getting them
Testing the Testing
Labels:
Education,
technocratic tendencies
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As a consequence of its teacher "accountability" initiatives, New York City has released performance reports on each teacher in the system.
However, as The Call has pointed out, these reports are not exactly the most exacting:
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However, as The Call has pointed out, these reports are not exactly the most exacting:
The Teacher Data Reports were compiled for three school years between 2007 and 2010, and were never meant to be made public, although the DOE used them as a tool to make tenure decisions. The data are supposed to reflect a teacher’s ability to affect fourth through eighth grade students’ progress on standardized tests. But the UFT argues the scores are misleading and based on questionable data. The average margin of error for English teachers is 53 percent, and 35 percent for math. That means a teacher with a score of 50 percent may really have scored anywhere from a 23 percent to a 77 percent. The breakdown compares teachers based on their amount of experience and takes into account gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic status - among other things - to try to show how teachers in similar situations are helping students improve.These huge margins of error would seem to be a big problem for assessing a teacher's competence---assuming that you believe that standardized testing performance is a good vehicle for this assessment (a questionable assumption at best).
Narrative of MA Premium Trends
Here's my write-up at the Huffington Post about my recent examination of the effects of Romneycare on Massachusetts premium trends.
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Is it unethical to collect premiums and not issue the insurance?
Hi...Saw your blog online, as I was searching for information.What happens if the closing attorney, who is also a title agent, never files the title insurance policy with the title company, and therefore never pays the title company for the policy that a client has purchased? Is it unethical to do this, and is there an amount of time that the attorney has to file? I'm referring to cases in which
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Superior Court rules that insurer was not required to continue relationship with agent begun under CAR
In Calianos v. Commerce Ins. Co., 2012 WL 414464 (Mass. Super.), Judge Fabricant of the Massachusetts Superior Court held than an auto insurer was not liable to an agent when it terminated high risk policies assigned to it under the Commonwealth Automobile Reinsurers (CAR) program, when CAR was replaced by Massachusetts Automobile Insurance Plan (MAIP).
Under the old CAR program, all insurers who wrote auto insurance policies in Massachusetts were required to accept all high-risk applicants for insurance, but they had the option of merely administering the policies and ceding the profits and losses from such policies to the residual market.
An insurance agent who was unable to obtain a voluntary contract with an insurer could apply to CAR to be assigned as an Exclusive Representative Producer, or ERP. CAR appointed each ERP to an insurer.
The Commissioner of Insurance replaced CAR with MAIP, which I discussed in these posts (hit the link and then scroll down). Under MAIP, insurers are assigned, based on their market share, policies issued to high risk drivers, and are required to absorb any losses from those policies. MAIP became effective in 2008.
Under MAIP, agents are no longer assigned on an involuntary basis to insurers. Only agents who are licensed as Assigned Risk Producers, or ARP's, service the high-risk market.
While CAR was still in effect in 2006, CAR assigned insurance agent Jason Calianos as an ERP to Commerce.
In January, 2009, after MAIP replaced CAR, Commerce informed Calianos that he would no longer have authority to solicit or bind new policies and that Commerce would non-renew his existing policies. Commerce then issued notices of nonrenewal to Calianos's customers.
Calianos sued Commerce, alleging that Commerce had amended or terminated its agreement with him without the requisite notice, and that it declined to renew his customers' policies, depriving him of commissions.
The court held:
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Under the old CAR program, all insurers who wrote auto insurance policies in Massachusetts were required to accept all high-risk applicants for insurance, but they had the option of merely administering the policies and ceding the profits and losses from such policies to the residual market.
An insurance agent who was unable to obtain a voluntary contract with an insurer could apply to CAR to be assigned as an Exclusive Representative Producer, or ERP. CAR appointed each ERP to an insurer.
The Commissioner of Insurance replaced CAR with MAIP, which I discussed in these posts (hit the link and then scroll down). Under MAIP, insurers are assigned, based on their market share, policies issued to high risk drivers, and are required to absorb any losses from those policies. MAIP became effective in 2008.
Under MAIP, agents are no longer assigned on an involuntary basis to insurers. Only agents who are licensed as Assigned Risk Producers, or ARP's, service the high-risk market.
While CAR was still in effect in 2006, CAR assigned insurance agent Jason Calianos as an ERP to Commerce.
In January, 2009, after MAIP replaced CAR, Commerce informed Calianos that he would no longer have authority to solicit or bind new policies and that Commerce would non-renew his existing policies. Commerce then issued notices of nonrenewal to Calianos's customers.
Calianos sued Commerce, alleging that Commerce had amended or terminated its agreement with him without the requisite notice, and that it declined to renew his customers' policies, depriving him of commissions.
The court held:
- Commerce did not breach Calianos's contract. His CAR contract terminated when CAR was replaced by MAIP.
- Commerce was not required by MAIP to continue its relationship with Calianos.
- Commerce did not act in bad faith when it did not renew Calianos's policies on a voluntary basis, because it was not required to do so and never had a voluntary relationship with him.
- Commerce was not liable for intentional interference with contractual relationships, because Commerce had no contractual duty to renew the CAR policies.
BOA moving on from FNMA
At the heart of the decision is recent changes in mortgage insurance policies. The filing notes Fannie Mae policy where MI rescission must be resolved in a timely fashion. As of Dec. 31, 2011, 74% of the MI rescission notices received had not been resolved, and Fannie began exercising repurchases with Bank of America.
Read more in HW.
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Read more in HW.
Federal Data: Health Insurance Premium Growth Has Slowed After Romneycare
Labels:
health-care,
insurance,
Mitt Romney
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In 2010, John F. Cogan, R. Glenn Hubbard, and Daniel P. Kessler published in Forum for Health Economics & Policy a report (“The Effect of Massachusetts’ Health Reform on Employer-Sponsored Insurance Premiums”) on the effects of Governor Mitt Romney's 2006 health-care reform in Massachusetts. This report suggested that, up until 2008, these reforms (hereafter referred to as "Romneycare") led to a relative increase in health-insurance premiums. This report was cited numerous times by opponents of Romney and helped fuel the belief that Romneycare caused health-insurance premiums to skyrocket in Massachusetts (even though Cogan et al. did not make this claim).
However, new data has now come out (covering through 2010), and this data tells a rather different story. It instead suggests that Massachusetts's health-insurance premium growth declined relative to the nation as a whole in the years since Romneycare has been enacted. From 2006 to 2010, employer-sponsored health-care premiums for a family rose about 19% in Massachusetts, while they rose about 22% in the US as a whole. Compare that to the period between 2002 and 2006, when Bay State family premiums increased 40% and US family premiums rose only 34.5%. Family premiums have seen the greatest reduction in growth since Romneycare; individual premiums have also slowed their rate of growth, though by not as much. For both family and individual premiums, the rate of growth fell below the national average in the period between 2008 and 2010.
The analysis below will look at the growth of employer-sponsored health-insurance premiums for families and for individuals prior to 2006 and after 2006. It will also look at the difference in growth rates for health-insurance premiums for businesses in the small group market (those with under 50 employees) and with businesses with more than 50 employees. The numbers shown are average premiums for families and individuals. I use the same source as the Cogan study mentioned above, the federally sponsored Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. (I also borrow some of my methodology from the Cogan study as well.)
Looking at employer-sponsored health-insurance premiums is a helpful lens for looking at the effects of Romneycare on the insurance market. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Census Bureau, 69% of Massachusetts residents under 65 were covered by employment-based health insurance in 2010. Nationally, a little over 58% of US residents under 65 were covered by employment-based insurance. So a significant portion of the Massachusetts insurance market is connected to employment.
I. Family Premiums v. Individual Premiums in Massachusetts
The following tables show the percentage growth in average family and individual premiums for the United States as a whole and Massachusetts during two periods: 2006 to 2010 (the four years after Romneycare) and 2002 to 2006 (the four years before it). Looking at the years prior to Romneycare's passage will give some sense of the overall growth rate of Massachusetts premiums before reform was enacted. Situating Massachusetts's growth numbers in the greater context of time and national trends will help evaluate the arc of the state's premium growth after Romneycare. For each period, I give the raw difference in percentage growth between Massachusetts premiums and those of the nation as a whole. A positive difference means that Massachusetts premiums are growing more quickly than those of the nation as a whole; a negative difference means that they are growing more slowly.
These charts also provide a raw differential for the differences between those two periods (arrived at by subtracting the 2010-2006 difference from the 2006-2002 difference). Under the circumstances explored in the present analysis, a positive differential suggests that Massachusetts premiums after the passage of Romneycare curved even more upwards relative to the nation as a whole; a negative differential suggests that, after the Massachusetts health-care reform, the rate of premium growth slowed relative to the nation as a whole.
Looking at the raw differences and differentials does not entirely reveal the precise magnitude of the change in premium increases for Massachusetts, so here's another chart showing the percentage premium increase in Massachusetts as a percentage of the US percentage premium increase. The US percentage increase is equal to 100%. So, for the 2002-2006 period, family premiums in Massachusetts grew 40%, while they grew 34.5% in the US; this would be represented as 116% in the chart below, as 40% is 116% of 34.5%.
This data suggests that family plans in the Bay State have witnessed the largest decline in growth. Situating Massachusetts within a broader, state-to-state context makes this decline in premium growth even more striking. By 2010, Massachusetts had the third-lowest average family premiums in New England (Vermont had the lowest, and Maine's family premium was $30 less than Massachusetts's) and had lower average family premiums than a number of other states in other regions, including New York, Illinois, Delaware, and Florida. Often held up as an example of a successful "red state" model on health-care as well as other issues, Texas has been less successful at slowing the growth of premiums than Massachusetts. The gap between these two states has shrunk since Romneycare has been enacted. The average family premium in Massachusetts was about $600 more than the average family premium in Texas in 2006 ($12,290 vs. $11,690). In 2010, the difference between average family premiums had declined to less than $100 ($14,606 vs. $14,526).
Health-insurance premium growth did not slow as much for individuals as it did for family plans. However, it still did slow in absolute terms and relative to the nation as a whole. By the the 2008-2010 period, the individual premium in Massachusetts grew about 5% slower than it did for the US (Bay State premiums grew 11.9% while US premiums grew 12.6%), so the gap between the two premium growth rates did narrow over the period.
It is also perhaps worth comparing not the magnitude of health-insurance premium growth but the size of premiums themselves for the US and Massachusetts. Below are two charts comparing US and Massachusetts average premiums for family and individual employer-sponsored health insurance plans. Listed is the average Massachusetts premium, the average US premium, and the Massachusetts premium as a percentage of the US premium (a percentage over 100% means that the Massachusetts premium is larger than the US premium).
In 2010, the average family premium in Massachusetts was closer to the national average after the passage of Romneycare than it was the year Romneycare was enacted. Indeed, the average family premium actually declined in Massachusetts from 2009 to 2010. The average individual premium grew a little bit relative to the nation as a whole from 2006 to 2010. However, this premium had been relatively even larger in the past (in 2004, for example). It will be interesting to see whether 2011 continued the downward trajectory in individual premium growth hinted at in 2010.
II. The Effects of Reform on Premiums for Small and Big Businesses in Massachusetts
The effects of Romney's reforms on small businesses remain a topic of considerable concern. In order to explore these effects, I have taken a look at the rates of premium growth for companies with fewer than 50 employees (the small group market) and for companies with more than 50 employees. The tables below, organized according to principles similar to those of the first two tables of this article, compare the growth rates for average health insurance premiums for small and big businesses in Massachusetts and the US.
There is an interesting difference in the growth rates of individual and family premiums for businesses with fewer than 50 employees and for those with more than 50 employees. For businesses with fewer than 50 employees, family premiums have increased at a faster rate relative to the nation as a whole since the passage of Romneycare, but single premiums have increased at a slower rate relative to the national average. Something like the converse occurs for businesses with more than 50 employees: family premium growth has declined relative to the nation as a whole, and single rate increases have correspondingly slowed compared to the nation as a whole but not as much as small-business single employee rates did. These numbers complicate any attempt to weigh the effects of Romneycare on small businesses insurance premiums.
III. 2010 Rate Dispute: Potential Implications
There is a potential fly in the ointment of this analysis: in April 2010, the state insurance commissioner vetoed numerous rate increases for the small-group market proposed by a number of major Massachusetts health-insurance plans. At first, the insurance companies sued to overrule this action. Then various insurers settled with the Commonwealth to put some rate increases in place. This legal difficulty does not, however, seem to fully explain why the average family premium actually declined in 2010; since rate hikes were approved, the average premium could easily have risen.
Furthermore, the family small group market witnessed some of the biggest rate increases in the years 2006-2010, so a decline in average premium growth was due to declining growth for premiums for larger employers (i.e., those employers mostly immune to the commissioner's ruling), which suggests that we should not overestimate the effects of this ruling on health-care premiums. Between 2006 and 2010, the family premium for small group employers in Massachusetts increased faster than it did for the nation as a whole, rising 23.2% while US premiums grew 18.7%. For employers with over 50 workers, health insurance premiums for a family plan grew slower than they did for US, increasing 17.8% while the national average climbed 22.4%. Furthermore small group family rates grew 6.5% in 2010 even as larger employer rates shrunk 2.6%. This dispute may have had some effect on the rate of insurance premiums growth, but it should not be overestimated.
Moreover, many health-insurance groups posted considerable surpluses in Massachusetts in 2010 (Massachusetts health insurance is dominated by non-profits, so "surpluses" are often used instead of "profits"). Three of the four biggest health insurers in Massachusetts (Harvard Pilgrim, Blue Cross/Blue Shield, and Tufts) had surpluses in 2010. The major Massachusetts-based insurer which lost money (Fallon Community Health Plan) had a smaller loss in 2010 than it did in 2009; in fact, 2009 was a worse year for Massachusetts insurer finances than 2010 was. So it is hard to say that the rate dispute pushed these plans to the brink of bankruptcy. For at least the first half of 2011, health insurance companies in Massachusetts were also posting big surpluses, in part because of slowing health-care costs.
IV. Conclusions and Comments
Obviously, the picture painted by this data is partial. Health-care costs paid by the consumer are not limited to health insurance premiums. However, it is perhaps worth noting that, in 2010, various other medical fees in Massachusetts (such as copays for visits to the doctor, deductibles, and coinsurance rates payable by consumers) were lower in Massachusetts than in the nation as a whole. Moreover, it would also be worthwhile to compare the per capita GDP of Massachusetts residents to health-insurance premiums. The Bay State has a relatively high per capita GDP, so it would be interesting to explore the change in premiums as a percentage of personal income over time. Taking into account these details may find a further reduction in health-care cost growth in Massachusetts compared to the US. As an additional point, looking at average premiums does not tell the whole story of premium growth in a state: looking at the growth of premiums at the low, middle, and high ends of health insurance plans would further reveal some of the implications of Romneycare for health insurance premiums.
This study is more an exercise in correlation rather than causation: it has not conclusively proved that Romneycare caused health-care premiums to slow their rate of growth in Massachusetts. But it does trouble the common claim that Romneycare uniquely caused premiums to skyrocket in Massachusetts. Instead, the four-year period after the passage of Romneycare witnessed slower growth than the four-year period before it---both in absolute terms and compared to the nation as a whole. In the period after 2006, premium growth for families fell below the growth rate for the national average, and the growth rate for individual premiums grew closer to the national average's growth rate. By the 2008-2010 period, both growth rates fell below the national average. This trend may not continue, but that is the current trend.
One of the premises of Romneycare was that universal insurance through government mandates and insurance subsidies to the poor would lead to slower growth rates in medical spending and insurance premiums. The spending growth rate on medical care seems to have declined in Massachusetts, and premium growth has either stayed the same or fallen relative to the national average. These trends alone do not make Romneycare a success, but they also suggest that health-insurance premium increases may not be a sufficient cause for declaring it a failure.
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However, new data has now come out (covering through 2010), and this data tells a rather different story. It instead suggests that Massachusetts's health-insurance premium growth declined relative to the nation as a whole in the years since Romneycare has been enacted. From 2006 to 2010, employer-sponsored health-care premiums for a family rose about 19% in Massachusetts, while they rose about 22% in the US as a whole. Compare that to the period between 2002 and 2006, when Bay State family premiums increased 40% and US family premiums rose only 34.5%. Family premiums have seen the greatest reduction in growth since Romneycare; individual premiums have also slowed their rate of growth, though by not as much. For both family and individual premiums, the rate of growth fell below the national average in the period between 2008 and 2010.
The analysis below will look at the growth of employer-sponsored health-insurance premiums for families and for individuals prior to 2006 and after 2006. It will also look at the difference in growth rates for health-insurance premiums for businesses in the small group market (those with under 50 employees) and with businesses with more than 50 employees. The numbers shown are average premiums for families and individuals. I use the same source as the Cogan study mentioned above, the federally sponsored Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. (I also borrow some of my methodology from the Cogan study as well.)
Looking at employer-sponsored health-insurance premiums is a helpful lens for looking at the effects of Romneycare on the insurance market. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Census Bureau, 69% of Massachusetts residents under 65 were covered by employment-based health insurance in 2010. Nationally, a little over 58% of US residents under 65 were covered by employment-based insurance. So a significant portion of the Massachusetts insurance market is connected to employment.
I. Family Premiums v. Individual Premiums in Massachusetts
The following tables show the percentage growth in average family and individual premiums for the United States as a whole and Massachusetts during two periods: 2006 to 2010 (the four years after Romneycare) and 2002 to 2006 (the four years before it). Looking at the years prior to Romneycare's passage will give some sense of the overall growth rate of Massachusetts premiums before reform was enacted. Situating Massachusetts's growth numbers in the greater context of time and national trends will help evaluate the arc of the state's premium growth after Romneycare. For each period, I give the raw difference in percentage growth between Massachusetts premiums and those of the nation as a whole. A positive difference means that Massachusetts premiums are growing more quickly than those of the nation as a whole; a negative difference means that they are growing more slowly.
These charts also provide a raw differential for the differences between those two periods (arrived at by subtracting the 2010-2006 difference from the 2006-2002 difference). Under the circumstances explored in the present analysis, a positive differential suggests that Massachusetts premiums after the passage of Romneycare curved even more upwards relative to the nation as a whole; a negative differential suggests that, after the Massachusetts health-care reform, the rate of premium growth slowed relative to the nation as a whole.
| A. Average Family Premiums | ||
| 2006-2010 | 2002-2006 | |
| US Premium % Growth | 21.9% | 34.5% |
| MA Premium % Growth | 18.8% | 40.0% |
| Difference in Growth (MA-US) | -3.1% | 5.5% |
| MA/US Differential 06-10 v 02-06 | -8.6% | |
| Source: Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, Insurance Component Table II.D1, 2002-2010 | ||
| B. Average Individual Premiums | ||
| 2006-2010 | 2002-2006 | |
| US Premium % Growth | 20.0% | 29.1% |
| MA Premium % Growth | 21.7% | 32.7% |
| Difference in Growth (MA-US) | 1.7% | 3.6% |
| MA/US Differential 06-10 v 02-06 | -1.9% | |
| Source: Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, Insurance Component Table II.C1, 2002-2010 | ||
Looking at the raw differences and differentials does not entirely reveal the precise magnitude of the change in premium increases for Massachusetts, so here's another chart showing the percentage premium increase in Massachusetts as a percentage of the US percentage premium increase. The US percentage increase is equal to 100%. So, for the 2002-2006 period, family premiums in Massachusetts grew 40%, while they grew 34.5% in the US; this would be represented as 116% in the chart below, as 40% is 116% of 34.5%.
| C. Premium growth compared to US Growth (US Growth =100%) | ||
| 2002-2006 | 2006-10 | |
| MA Family Premiums | 116.0% | 85.8% |
| Ma Individual Premium | 112.1% | 108.7% |
This data suggests that family plans in the Bay State have witnessed the largest decline in growth. Situating Massachusetts within a broader, state-to-state context makes this decline in premium growth even more striking. By 2010, Massachusetts had the third-lowest average family premiums in New England (Vermont had the lowest, and Maine's family premium was $30 less than Massachusetts's) and had lower average family premiums than a number of other states in other regions, including New York, Illinois, Delaware, and Florida. Often held up as an example of a successful "red state" model on health-care as well as other issues, Texas has been less successful at slowing the growth of premiums than Massachusetts. The gap between these two states has shrunk since Romneycare has been enacted. The average family premium in Massachusetts was about $600 more than the average family premium in Texas in 2006 ($12,290 vs. $11,690). In 2010, the difference between average family premiums had declined to less than $100 ($14,606 vs. $14,526).
Health-insurance premium growth did not slow as much for individuals as it did for family plans. However, it still did slow in absolute terms and relative to the nation as a whole. By the the 2008-2010 period, the individual premium in Massachusetts grew about 5% slower than it did for the US (Bay State premiums grew 11.9% while US premiums grew 12.6%), so the gap between the two premium growth rates did narrow over the period.
It is also perhaps worth comparing not the magnitude of health-insurance premium growth but the size of premiums themselves for the US and Massachusetts. Below are two charts comparing US and Massachusetts average premiums for family and individual employer-sponsored health insurance plans. Listed is the average Massachusetts premium, the average US premium, and the Massachusetts premium as a percentage of the US premium (a percentage over 100% means that the Massachusetts premium is larger than the US premium).
| D. Average Family Premiums (in US $) | |||||
| US | MA | MA as % of US | |||
| 2010 | 13871 | 14606 | 105.3% | ||
| 2009 | 13027 | 14723 | 113% | ||
| 2008 | 12298 | 13788 | 112.1% | ||
| 2006 | 11381 | 12290 | 108% | ||
| 2005 | 10728 | 11435 | 106.6% | ||
| 2004 | 10006 | 10559 | 105.5% | ||
| 2003 | 9249 | 9867 | 106.7% | ||
| Source: Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, Insurance Component Table II.D1, 2002-2010 | |||||
| E. Average Individual Premiums (in US $) | |||
| US | MA | MA as % of US | |
| 2010 | 4940 | 5413 | 109.6% |
| 2009 | 4669 | 5268 | 112.8% |
| 2008 | 4386 | 4836 | 110.3% |
| 2006 | 4118 | 4448 | 108% |
| 2005 | 3991 | 4235 | 106.1% |
| 2004 | 3705 | 4141 | 111.8% |
| 2003 | 3481 | 3496 | 100.4% |
| Source: Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, Insurance Component Table II.C1, 2002-2010 | |||
In 2010, the average family premium in Massachusetts was closer to the national average after the passage of Romneycare than it was the year Romneycare was enacted. Indeed, the average family premium actually declined in Massachusetts from 2009 to 2010. The average individual premium grew a little bit relative to the nation as a whole from 2006 to 2010. However, this premium had been relatively even larger in the past (in 2004, for example). It will be interesting to see whether 2011 continued the downward trajectory in individual premium growth hinted at in 2010.
II. The Effects of Reform on Premiums for Small and Big Businesses in Massachusetts
The effects of Romney's reforms on small businesses remain a topic of considerable concern. In order to explore these effects, I have taken a look at the rates of premium growth for companies with fewer than 50 employees (the small group market) and for companies with more than 50 employees. The tables below, organized according to principles similar to those of the first two tables of this article, compare the growth rates for average health insurance premiums for small and big businesses in Massachusetts and the US.
| F. Family Premiums--Small Businesses | ||
| 2006-2010 | 2002-2006 | |
| US Premium % Growth | 18.7% | 30.5% |
| MA Premium % Growth | 23.2% | 26.0% |
| Difference in Growth (MA-US) | 4.5% | -4.5% |
| MA/US Differential 06-10 v 02-06 | 9.0% | |
| Source: Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, Insurance Component Table II.D1, 2002-2010 | ||
| G. Family Premiums--Businesses with over 50 Employees | ||
| 2006-2010 | 2002-2006 | |
| US Premium % Growth | 22.4% | 35.2% |
| MA Premium % Growth | 17.8% | 43.1% |
| Difference in Growth (MA-US) | -4.6% | 7.9% |
| MA/US Differential 06-10 v 02-06 | -12.50% | |
| Source: Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, Insurance Component Table II.D1, 2002-2010 | ||
| H. Individual Premiums--Small Businesses | ||
| 2006-2010 | 2002-2006 | |
| US Premium % Growth | 16.3% | 26.2% |
| MA Premium % Growth | 14.7% | 32.6% |
| Difference in Growth (MA-US) | -1.6% | 6.4% |
| MA/US Differential 06-10 v 02-06 | -8.00% | |
| Source: Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, Insurance Component Table II.C1, 2002-2010 | ||
| I. Individual Premiums--Businesses with over 50 Employees | ||
| 2006-2010 | 2002-2006 | |
| US Premium % Growth | 21.0% | 30.1% |
| MA Premium % Growth | 23.4% | 33.1% |
| Difference in Growth (MA-US) | 2.4% | 3.0% |
| MA/US Differential 06-10 v 02-06 | -0.60% | |
| Source: Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, Insurance Component Table II.C1, 2002-2010 | ||
There is an interesting difference in the growth rates of individual and family premiums for businesses with fewer than 50 employees and for those with more than 50 employees. For businesses with fewer than 50 employees, family premiums have increased at a faster rate relative to the nation as a whole since the passage of Romneycare, but single premiums have increased at a slower rate relative to the national average. Something like the converse occurs for businesses with more than 50 employees: family premium growth has declined relative to the nation as a whole, and single rate increases have correspondingly slowed compared to the nation as a whole but not as much as small-business single employee rates did. These numbers complicate any attempt to weigh the effects of Romneycare on small businesses insurance premiums.
III. 2010 Rate Dispute: Potential Implications
There is a potential fly in the ointment of this analysis: in April 2010, the state insurance commissioner vetoed numerous rate increases for the small-group market proposed by a number of major Massachusetts health-insurance plans. At first, the insurance companies sued to overrule this action. Then various insurers settled with the Commonwealth to put some rate increases in place. This legal difficulty does not, however, seem to fully explain why the average family premium actually declined in 2010; since rate hikes were approved, the average premium could easily have risen.
Furthermore, the family small group market witnessed some of the biggest rate increases in the years 2006-2010, so a decline in average premium growth was due to declining growth for premiums for larger employers (i.e., those employers mostly immune to the commissioner's ruling), which suggests that we should not overestimate the effects of this ruling on health-care premiums. Between 2006 and 2010, the family premium for small group employers in Massachusetts increased faster than it did for the nation as a whole, rising 23.2% while US premiums grew 18.7%. For employers with over 50 workers, health insurance premiums for a family plan grew slower than they did for US, increasing 17.8% while the national average climbed 22.4%. Furthermore small group family rates grew 6.5% in 2010 even as larger employer rates shrunk 2.6%. This dispute may have had some effect on the rate of insurance premiums growth, but it should not be overestimated.
Moreover, many health-insurance groups posted considerable surpluses in Massachusetts in 2010 (Massachusetts health insurance is dominated by non-profits, so "surpluses" are often used instead of "profits"). Three of the four biggest health insurers in Massachusetts (Harvard Pilgrim, Blue Cross/Blue Shield, and Tufts) had surpluses in 2010. The major Massachusetts-based insurer which lost money (Fallon Community Health Plan) had a smaller loss in 2010 than it did in 2009; in fact, 2009 was a worse year for Massachusetts insurer finances than 2010 was. So it is hard to say that the rate dispute pushed these plans to the brink of bankruptcy. For at least the first half of 2011, health insurance companies in Massachusetts were also posting big surpluses, in part because of slowing health-care costs.
IV. Conclusions and Comments
Obviously, the picture painted by this data is partial. Health-care costs paid by the consumer are not limited to health insurance premiums. However, it is perhaps worth noting that, in 2010, various other medical fees in Massachusetts (such as copays for visits to the doctor, deductibles, and coinsurance rates payable by consumers) were lower in Massachusetts than in the nation as a whole. Moreover, it would also be worthwhile to compare the per capita GDP of Massachusetts residents to health-insurance premiums. The Bay State has a relatively high per capita GDP, so it would be interesting to explore the change in premiums as a percentage of personal income over time. Taking into account these details may find a further reduction in health-care cost growth in Massachusetts compared to the US. As an additional point, looking at average premiums does not tell the whole story of premium growth in a state: looking at the growth of premiums at the low, middle, and high ends of health insurance plans would further reveal some of the implications of Romneycare for health insurance premiums.
This study is more an exercise in correlation rather than causation: it has not conclusively proved that Romneycare caused health-care premiums to slow their rate of growth in Massachusetts. But it does trouble the common claim that Romneycare uniquely caused premiums to skyrocket in Massachusetts. Instead, the four-year period after the passage of Romneycare witnessed slower growth than the four-year period before it---both in absolute terms and compared to the nation as a whole. In the period after 2006, premium growth for families fell below the growth rate for the national average, and the growth rate for individual premiums grew closer to the national average's growth rate. By the 2008-2010 period, both growth rates fell below the national average. This trend may not continue, but that is the current trend.
One of the premises of Romneycare was that universal insurance through government mandates and insurance subsidies to the poor would lead to slower growth rates in medical spending and insurance premiums. The spending growth rate on medical care seems to have declined in Massachusetts, and premium growth has either stayed the same or fallen relative to the national average. These trends alone do not make Romneycare a success, but they also suggest that health-insurance premium increases may not be a sufficient cause for declaring it a failure.
The folks at CAARE would like you to sign their petition concerning RESPA statute of limitations.
The Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act (RESPA) is the enforcement tool of the new Consumer Finance and Protection Bureau (CFPB). RESPA is a consumer disclosure and anti-kickback law. However, with a one year statute of limitations, the prospect for meaningful enforcement or fines to act as a deterrent is non-existent.
For a business intent on paying illegal kickbacks it is only a
Joe sold too much land by accident.
Title ins. co. or bank put wrong survey on the deed The new owners refuse to sign corrected deed The title co. is going to have me sign a affidavit saying my intention was to sell 3 acres not 11 that was mistakenly noted on deed What will this do for me? They are going to register this along with the deed. Is there anything else i can do to get back my 8 acres? Thank you for your time Joe
Hi
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Hi
She shredded the files.
I've been trying to write a post about a title agent who sold her agency to an attorney. She used to run a few affiliated agencies out of one office - one was owned by a large regional real estate broker. I wasn't really paying any attention to this matter, infact, I had no idea that the agencies had closed or the lead agency sold. I just happened to have an unsatisfied mortgage related to a
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title company wants to pay Realtors commissions for business
I am a Realtor and I have a minority ownership in a title company. The title company wants to formalize a plan to pay me a 'commission' on any deals that I send to them. I would disclose to my clients that I am a part owner of the title company. Is this legal or is this a RESPA violation? The title company is planning to go to dozens of Realtors and offer them a partial ownership deal whereby
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Separating Self-Insurance Facts From Fiction
Note: The following commentary appears in the February 20, 2012 edition of Business Insurance Magazine as part of its special spotlight report on self-insurance for the middle market.
Small and midsize companies are looking at self-insurance as a cost-effective health care benefits solution as Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act deadlines approach. Michael W. Ferguson serves as chief operating officer for the Self-Insurance Institute of America Inc., looks at facts and myths surrounding the decision to self-insure.
As more smaller and midsize companies look to self-insurance solutions to control escalating group health care costs in the wake of passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, this proactive risk management approach has attracted increased negative attention from traditional health insurance industry and state regulators who warn of various calamities.
Of course, this criticism is largely predictable, as health insurance carriers are worried about market-share erosion, and state regulators don’t like the fact they cannot directly regulate self-insured group health plans because of Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) pre-emption. Nonetheless, it’s worth pointing out some of the more frequently repeated canards in order to help clear up any confusion this may cause for employers considering self-insurance.
But first the disclaimer: Self-insurance is not the best option for every employer, regardless of size. In fact, it could be a very bad option based on a variety of considerations. In this regard, it is highly recommended that employers engage in the same type of thorough due diligence they would rely on for any other major financial decision.
That said, let’s jump in and separate some important myths from realities.
Perhaps the most unfortunate allegation is that a primary motive for many employers to self-insure is that they can escape regulation, raising consumer protection concerns. While it is true that self-insured plans are not subject to state benefit mandates, there is no evidence to suggest that self-insured employers scrimp on covered benefits. In fact, it is widely acknowledged that self-insured plans incorporate more robust coverage terms for key health services because they have the ability to customize their plans to meet the specific needs of their employees.
And for employers switching to self-insurance since the passage of PPACA, they don’t evade any new substantive federal regulations—except those specifically geared for commercial health insurance carriers—because, by definition, they would establish “non-grandfathered” plans.
The reality is that self-insured employers actually subject themselves to more regulatory requirements because they are governed by ERISA, which prescribes strict federal rules for plan fiduciaries, among other requirements designed to protect the interests of plan participants.
Some critics also claim that self-insured health plans are more cost-effective because they deny claims at a higher rate than fully insured plans. But in a report issued by the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services last year, HHS-contracted researchers from RAND Corp. concluded that there is no evidence of such disparity.
Then there’s the belief that self-insured plan participants pay higher premiums than their fully insured counterparts. The available data does not support this conclusion, either.
As part of a U.S. Department of Labor report on self-insured health plans released last year, Deloitte Financial Advisory Services L.L.P. and Advanced Analytical Consulting Group, Inc. found that from 2009 to 2010 for employers with more than 200 covered lives, the average per employee premium contribution to be covered by fully-insured plans increased by $808 compared to average increase of $248 for self-insured premiums.
Most recently, influential academics and public policymakers predicted that such self-insured plans would contribute to adverse selection when insurance market reforms are fully implemented, suggesting that employers would switch back and forth between self-insured and exchange-offered plans based on their claims experience on a yearly basis.
That’s a nice conspiracy theory for sure, but it does not match up with marketplace realities. The fact is that due to ongoing administrative and compliance requirements, employers cannot simply switch their self-insured plans on and off.
Moreover, once an employer transitions to a fully insured health plan, it loses possession of claims data, which makes it more difficult to re-establish a self-insured plan in the future regardless of other considerations.
Claims data is arguably the most important health plan asset, as it can help employers control future health plan costs and can be used to customized plan design details. Giving up this asset over one bad claim year is not a decision to be taken lightly by plan sponsors.
The health care marketplace is certainly evolving, creating shifting roles for self-insurers, commercial health insurance companies and public sector payers. All three industry segments contribute in different ways to ensure that coverage is as available and affordable for the widest population possible.
Those who disseminate misleading information about any of these segments do a disservice to the ongoing public dialogue on how to improve the country’s health care system.
Read More >>
Small and midsize companies are looking at self-insurance as a cost-effective health care benefits solution as Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act deadlines approach. Michael W. Ferguson serves as chief operating officer for the Self-Insurance Institute of America Inc., looks at facts and myths surrounding the decision to self-insure.
As more smaller and midsize companies look to self-insurance solutions to control escalating group health care costs in the wake of passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, this proactive risk management approach has attracted increased negative attention from traditional health insurance industry and state regulators who warn of various calamities.
Of course, this criticism is largely predictable, as health insurance carriers are worried about market-share erosion, and state regulators don’t like the fact they cannot directly regulate self-insured group health plans because of Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) pre-emption. Nonetheless, it’s worth pointing out some of the more frequently repeated canards in order to help clear up any confusion this may cause for employers considering self-insurance.
But first the disclaimer: Self-insurance is not the best option for every employer, regardless of size. In fact, it could be a very bad option based on a variety of considerations. In this regard, it is highly recommended that employers engage in the same type of thorough due diligence they would rely on for any other major financial decision.
That said, let’s jump in and separate some important myths from realities.
Perhaps the most unfortunate allegation is that a primary motive for many employers to self-insure is that they can escape regulation, raising consumer protection concerns. While it is true that self-insured plans are not subject to state benefit mandates, there is no evidence to suggest that self-insured employers scrimp on covered benefits. In fact, it is widely acknowledged that self-insured plans incorporate more robust coverage terms for key health services because they have the ability to customize their plans to meet the specific needs of their employees.
And for employers switching to self-insurance since the passage of PPACA, they don’t evade any new substantive federal regulations—except those specifically geared for commercial health insurance carriers—because, by definition, they would establish “non-grandfathered” plans.
The reality is that self-insured employers actually subject themselves to more regulatory requirements because they are governed by ERISA, which prescribes strict federal rules for plan fiduciaries, among other requirements designed to protect the interests of plan participants.
Some critics also claim that self-insured health plans are more cost-effective because they deny claims at a higher rate than fully insured plans. But in a report issued by the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services last year, HHS-contracted researchers from RAND Corp. concluded that there is no evidence of such disparity.
Then there’s the belief that self-insured plan participants pay higher premiums than their fully insured counterparts. The available data does not support this conclusion, either.
As part of a U.S. Department of Labor report on self-insured health plans released last year, Deloitte Financial Advisory Services L.L.P. and Advanced Analytical Consulting Group, Inc. found that from 2009 to 2010 for employers with more than 200 covered lives, the average per employee premium contribution to be covered by fully-insured plans increased by $808 compared to average increase of $248 for self-insured premiums.
Most recently, influential academics and public policymakers predicted that such self-insured plans would contribute to adverse selection when insurance market reforms are fully implemented, suggesting that employers would switch back and forth between self-insured and exchange-offered plans based on their claims experience on a yearly basis.
That’s a nice conspiracy theory for sure, but it does not match up with marketplace realities. The fact is that due to ongoing administrative and compliance requirements, employers cannot simply switch their self-insured plans on and off.
Moreover, once an employer transitions to a fully insured health plan, it loses possession of claims data, which makes it more difficult to re-establish a self-insured plan in the future regardless of other considerations.
Claims data is arguably the most important health plan asset, as it can help employers control future health plan costs and can be used to customized plan design details. Giving up this asset over one bad claim year is not a decision to be taken lightly by plan sponsors.
The health care marketplace is certainly evolving, creating shifting roles for self-insurers, commercial health insurance companies and public sector payers. All three industry segments contribute in different ways to ensure that coverage is as available and affordable for the widest population possible.
Those who disseminate misleading information about any of these segments do a disservice to the ongoing public dialogue on how to improve the country’s health care system.
In huge victory for insureds, SJC holds that measure of multiple damages in 93A claim is underlying judgment
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On Friday, in a case which has been closely watched by those on both sides of the insurer/insured divide (and by those of us who straddle the divide), the SJC has overturned in no uncertain terms a ruling by the Massachusetts Appeals Court regarding calculation of multiple damages in a 93A claim against an insurer for unfair settlement practices. The Appeals Court had held that the multiple damages in a 93A claim where the underlying tort claim has gone to judgment are calculated by the loss of use of settlement funds -- in other words, interest from the time a reasonable settlement offer should have been made until it actually was made. I was shocked by the Appeals Court decision when it came out, because it contradicted the plain language of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A s. 2, which states that multiple damages are based on the underlying judgment.
The SJC also held that to recover under ch. 93A the insureds do not have to prove that they would have accepted a reasonable settlement offer had one been made.
In January, 2002, Marcia Rhodes received catastrophic injuries including permanent paraplegia when a tractor trailer rear-ended her car. She and her family sued the truck driver, his employer, and the company to which he had been assigned by his employer.
At trial in September, 2004, the plaintiffs received a trial judgment of approximately $11.3 million. During the appeal process the plaintiffs settled the claim with the defendants' insurers.
Before settlement the plaintiffs filed a 93A claim against the insurers for failing to enter into a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement.
The trial court ruled on the 93A claim that excess carrier AIGDC had violated ch. 93A, but that the violation did not cause the plaintiffs any damages prior to trial because they would not have accepted even a timely reasonable offer prior to trial. The trial court also held that the 93A damages for AIGDC's failure to settle immediately after trial were the loss of use of the settlement funds.
On appeal, the Massachusetts Appeals Court held that the plaintiffs suffered damages as a result of both AIGDC's pre- and post-trial conduct. Like the trial court, it held that the measure of damages was the loss of use of the settlement funds.
On Friday, February 10, 2012, the SJC reversed. In Rhodes v. AIG Domestic Claims, Inc., 2012 WL 401034 (Mass.), the court first held that the plaintiffs are not required to prove that they would have accepted a prompt, reasonable settlement offer if the insurer had made such an offer.
It then held that the measure of damages is the underlying judgment is the plaintiffs' tort action, not loss of use of settlement funds.
The basis for this decision is Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, s. 2, which states, "For the purposes of this chapter, the amount of actual damages to be multiplied by the court shall be the amount of the judgment on all claims arising out of the same and underlying transaction or occurrence."
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The SJC also held that to recover under ch. 93A the insureds do not have to prove that they would have accepted a reasonable settlement offer had one been made.
In January, 2002, Marcia Rhodes received catastrophic injuries including permanent paraplegia when a tractor trailer rear-ended her car. She and her family sued the truck driver, his employer, and the company to which he had been assigned by his employer.
At trial in September, 2004, the plaintiffs received a trial judgment of approximately $11.3 million. During the appeal process the plaintiffs settled the claim with the defendants' insurers.
Before settlement the plaintiffs filed a 93A claim against the insurers for failing to enter into a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement.
The trial court ruled on the 93A claim that excess carrier AIGDC had violated ch. 93A, but that the violation did not cause the plaintiffs any damages prior to trial because they would not have accepted even a timely reasonable offer prior to trial. The trial court also held that the 93A damages for AIGDC's failure to settle immediately after trial were the loss of use of the settlement funds.
On appeal, the Massachusetts Appeals Court held that the plaintiffs suffered damages as a result of both AIGDC's pre- and post-trial conduct. Like the trial court, it held that the measure of damages was the loss of use of the settlement funds.
On Friday, February 10, 2012, the SJC reversed. In Rhodes v. AIG Domestic Claims, Inc., 2012 WL 401034 (Mass.), the court first held that the plaintiffs are not required to prove that they would have accepted a prompt, reasonable settlement offer if the insurer had made such an offer.
It then held that the measure of damages is the underlying judgment is the plaintiffs' tort action, not loss of use of settlement funds.
The basis for this decision is Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, s. 2, which states, "For the purposes of this chapter, the amount of actual damages to be multiplied by the court shall be the amount of the judgment on all claims arising out of the same and underlying transaction or occurrence."
Should the seller pay for revised tax prorations based on a new assessment after closing?
Hi Diane,
we sold our home on July 28th, 2011, and i just recieved a letter (Feb 7, 2012) from the buyers of our home that i owe them a check for 231.00 for the price difference in the amount that thier property taxes have now gone up due to the home has gone up in assesed/appraised value. At closing, we paid for property taxes from 1/1/2011-7/28/2011 per the HUD based on the previous years
new Facebook page
Hey, if you like Facebook, visit our new Facebook page and LIKE us! ;)
Fantastic resource on professional liability insurance
The Washington, D.C. firm of Jackson & Campbell has posted a 50-state review of professional liability insurance coverage. Click here for the link.
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Pennsylvania Treasury holding FREE escheat webinar.
The Pennsylvania Treasury is holding a free unclaimed property webinar on Thursday, February 23, 2012, from 2:00 p.m. - 3:00 p.m. Register NowAll companies and organizations doing business in Pennsylvania are subject to the Unclaimed Property Law, and April 15th is the deadline to file an annual report with Treasury. This webinar will focus on the reporting process, and discuss how to:
Why You Must Have A Car Insurance
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Car Insurance
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Car insurance it is something that is required by law and it protects you and your car. Car insurance is a very important instrument which can help you avoid large unforeseen collision costs is automobile insurance. When you experience a road incident and vehicles or property is destroyed, your automobile insurance can help you pay another party for any loss. That is provided you are proved to have caused the incident. It is also possible to compensate for death or physical injuries through your policy.A normal incident consists of nearly anything from little blemishes and cracks to the complete wreckage of your entire car. In case your vehicle is a little broken, you only need to pay one or two hundred dollars. However a serious repair costs thousands and thousands. It depends on where the damage is. You might have damaged some unique parts too. And you may also need to restore your paintwork. Hence repair cost varies significantly.
In case your auto insurance premium is only a small fraction of the repair fee, it could be worthwhile to claim from the insurance provider. Nevertheless in case the claims is simply a fraction of your premiums, it really is not good to file for claims. The reason being you might have increased premiums you have to pay every time you make a claim. The more claims you make, the higher will be the vehicle insurance premium you have to pay in the following 3 years. This could appear ridiculous, but it's certainly true.
You should only claim from the insurance plan if your collision damage is higher than your insurance coverage premium by a large factor. This means your insurance claims must be no less than 150 percent of the premium amount for you to help make your insurance claim worth it. Definitely, if you have any form of financial stress as a consequence of a sizable car accident bill, file the automobile insurance claims instantly.
Any sort of collision that concerns actual injury has the possibility to get real messy. Medical help is typically required right away. As such, critical treatments, medical costs and hospital expenses may suck your banking account dry very quickly if you are found guilty of inducing the accident. This makes motor insurance policy increasingly essential. Accidents can happen. Accidents are occasions which nobody wants. Yet they still happen. Your car insurance policy looks after this kind of risk for you as the insurance company will pay for all the loss you cause in the event of a car accident.
There are several kinds of auto insurance. Be sure you choose a comprehensive plan. The reason being a third party or 3rd party fire and theft insurance policy merely handles the damage you bring about to other people. Your own automobile is left exposed to harm. Thus you're still left vulnerable to large financial obligations if your automobile is totally broken.
Do not wait any longer, soon your vehicle insured now.
Why You Must Have A Car Insurance
Labels:
Car Insurance
0
comments
Car insurance it is something that is required by law and it protects you and your car. Car insurance is a very important instrument which can help you avoid large unforeseen collision costs is automobile insurance. When you experience a road incident and vehicles or property is destroyed, your automobile insurance can help you pay another party for any loss. That is provided you are proved to have caused the incident. It is also possible to compensate for death or physical injuries through your policy.A normal incident consists of nearly anything from little blemishes and cracks to the complete wreckage of your entire car. In case your vehicle is a little broken, you only need to pay one or two hundred dollars. However a serious repair costs thousands and thousands. It depends on where the damage is. You might have damaged some unique parts too. And you may also need to restore your paintwork. Hence repair cost varies significantly.
In case your auto insurance premium is only a small fraction of the repair fee, it could be worthwhile to claim from the insurance provider. Nevertheless in case the claims is simply a fraction of your premiums, it really is not good to file for claims. The reason being you might have increased premiums you have to pay every time you make a claim. The more claims you make, the higher will be the vehicle insurance premium you have to pay in the following 3 years. This could appear ridiculous, but it's certainly true.
You should only claim from the insurance plan if your collision damage is higher than your insurance coverage premium by a large factor. This means your insurance claims must be no less than 150 percent of the premium amount for you to help make your insurance claim worth it. Definitely, if you have any form of financial stress as a consequence of a sizable car accident bill, file the automobile insurance claims instantly.
Any sort of collision that concerns actual injury has the possibility to get real messy. Medical help is typically required right away. As such, critical treatments, medical costs and hospital expenses may suck your banking account dry very quickly if you are found guilty of inducing the accident. This makes motor insurance policy increasingly essential. Accidents can happen. Accidents are occasions which nobody wants. Yet they still happen. Your car insurance policy looks after this kind of risk for you as the insurance company will pay for all the loss you cause in the event of a car accident.
There are several kinds of auto insurance. Be sure you choose a comprehensive plan. The reason being a third party or 3rd party fire and theft insurance policy merely handles the damage you bring about to other people. Your own automobile is left exposed to harm. Thus you're still left vulnerable to large financial obligations if your automobile is totally broken.
Do not wait any longer, soon your vehicle insured now.
First Circuit holds no coverage for breach of contract damages
In Lopez & Medina Corp. v. Marsh USA, Inc., __ F.3d __, 2012 WL 229856 (1st. Cir.), the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that coverage under a liability policy does not extend to breach of contract damages.
The insured argued that the policy covered breach of contract damages because in it the insurer agreed to pay "all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages."
The court, which was deciding a case on appeal for the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, noted that there was no Puerto Rican case law on point. It based its holding on the unanimous opinions of other jurisdictions as well as insurance treatises.
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The insured argued that the policy covered breach of contract damages because in it the insurer agreed to pay "all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages."
The court, which was deciding a case on appeal for the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, noted that there was no Puerto Rican case law on point. It based its holding on the unanimous opinions of other jurisdictions as well as insurance treatises.
thanks to Housing Wire for the link to this NYT link on Fannie Mae
WOW
Mr. Nye LaValle is a RADICAL HERO!!
Appeals Court holds insurer not liable for misrepresentations of attorney representing it in subrogation action
During a delivery of heating oil to the residence of Elaine Sandman a delivery line burst, causing her basement to flood with oil. Sandman's insurer, Quincy Mutual, agreed to cover the cost of cleaning the spill, but the policy excluded coverage for damage to Sandman's personal property.
Quincy Mutual hired an attorney to bring a subrogation action against the oil delivery company. According to Sandman's complaint, over the course of five years the attorney consistently led her to believe that he represented her interests as well as those of Quincy Mutual and that he was seeking to recover her damages for loss to personal property.
Quincy Mutual's subrogation claim settled in the spring of 2009. At that time the attorney informed Sandman that he could not help her with her own claim because of a conflict of interest as Quincy Mutual's attorney. Sandmans' claims were barred by that time by the statute of limitations.
Sandman sued the attorney and Quincy Mutual. Quincy Mutual moved to dismiss, on the ground that it was not vicariously liable to Sandman for the attorney's malpractice and misrepresentations.
In Sandman v. Quincy Mut. Fire Ins.Co., 81 Mass. App. Ct. 188 (2012), Judge Grasso held that as a matter of law Quincy Mutual cannot be vicariously liable for the representations and professional negligence of the attorney, "because as an attorney and an independent professional he has a nondelegable duty of care to Sandman." Neither an insurer nor any other third party may exercise control over the independent judgment in the representation of a client.
Judge Brown dissented. Whereas Judge Grasso analyzed the issue from the perspective of the attorney's attorney-client relationship with Sandman, Judge Brown analyzed the issue from the perspective of the attorney's attorney-client relationship with Quincy Mutual. He wrote that the allegations of the complaint were sufficient to establish that the attorney may have had actual authority to act on behalf of Quincy Mutual. He also noted that the acts of an attorney in the conduct of litigation are binding upon the client. He distinguished cases discussing liability of an insurer for counsel it hired to represent an insured, because in that situation the attorney, while paid by the insurer, does not represent the insurer; in the present situation the attorney represented Quincy Mutual.
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Quincy Mutual hired an attorney to bring a subrogation action against the oil delivery company. According to Sandman's complaint, over the course of five years the attorney consistently led her to believe that he represented her interests as well as those of Quincy Mutual and that he was seeking to recover her damages for loss to personal property.
Quincy Mutual's subrogation claim settled in the spring of 2009. At that time the attorney informed Sandman that he could not help her with her own claim because of a conflict of interest as Quincy Mutual's attorney. Sandmans' claims were barred by that time by the statute of limitations.
Sandman sued the attorney and Quincy Mutual. Quincy Mutual moved to dismiss, on the ground that it was not vicariously liable to Sandman for the attorney's malpractice and misrepresentations.
In Sandman v. Quincy Mut. Fire Ins.Co., 81 Mass. App. Ct. 188 (2012), Judge Grasso held that as a matter of law Quincy Mutual cannot be vicariously liable for the representations and professional negligence of the attorney, "because as an attorney and an independent professional he has a nondelegable duty of care to Sandman." Neither an insurer nor any other third party may exercise control over the independent judgment in the representation of a client.
Judge Brown dissented. Whereas Judge Grasso analyzed the issue from the perspective of the attorney's attorney-client relationship with Sandman, Judge Brown analyzed the issue from the perspective of the attorney's attorney-client relationship with Quincy Mutual. He wrote that the allegations of the complaint were sufficient to establish that the attorney may have had actual authority to act on behalf of Quincy Mutual. He also noted that the acts of an attorney in the conduct of litigation are binding upon the client. He distinguished cases discussing liability of an insurer for counsel it hired to represent an insured, because in that situation the attorney, while paid by the insurer, does not represent the insurer; in the present situation the attorney represented Quincy Mutual.
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